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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2970 
___________ 
 
JAMES M. SINGER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BUREAU OF PROFESSIONAL & OCCUPATIONAL AFFAIRS; STATE BOARD OF 
PSYCHOLOGY; FRANK MONACO; JOHN D. KELLY; JOHN PIFER; SALLY 
ULRICH; JOHN GILLESPIE; FBI AGENT HARRIS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-03059) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 21, 2016 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 3, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant James Singer had his license to practice psychology suspended in 1992.  
Since that time, he has repeatedly − and unsuccessfully − sought to have his license 
reinstated and to have certain institutions, boards, and individuals held accountable for 
what he believes was an unlawful suspension.  In 2013, Singer filed his seventh civil 
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging “continuing violations” of his 
constitutional rights stemming from the suspension.  The District Court dismissed the 
complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii).  This appeal ensued.  Because we find the appeal to be meritless, 
we will affirm.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
sua sponte dismissal of the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii) is plenary.  See 
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).1 
 We agree with the District Court that Singer’s claims against the first four named 
defendants are barred by the principles of res judicata, or claim preclusion, which apply 
when there has been “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the 
same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of 
action.”  United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 
In re Montgomery Ward, LLC, 634 F.3d 732, 736-37 (3d Cir. 2011).   Singer previously 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
1 Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties, we need not set forth the factual or 
procedural background of this case in detail.  
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sought relief against these defendants for the same or similar actions.  See Singer v. 
Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 523 F. App’x 185, 187 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 
CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that 
res judicata applies to claims that could have been raised in a prior proceeding).  
Contrary to Singer’s contention, the fact that the claims were previously dismissed as 
time-barred does not prevent application of claim preclusion.  See Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (“The rules of finality, both statutory and judge 
made, treat a dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds the same way they treat a 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, for failure to prove substantive liability, or for 
failure to prosecute: as a judgment on the merits.”).   
 Singer’s claims against Sally Ulrich, John Gillespie, and Agent Harris are barred 
by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(1); 
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1985) (forum state’s statute of limitations for 
personal injury actions applies to § 1983 actions).  Singer failed to plead a continuing 
violation sufficient to invoke an equitable exception to the requirement of timely filing.  
See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001); see also O’Connor v. City 
of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2006) (the “statute of limitations begins to run at 
the time the claim accrues, and [  ] time-barred claims cannot be resurrected by being 
aggregated and labeled ‘continuing violations.’”).  He maintains that there are continuing 
violations “related to retaliation to cover up child abuse that [he] reported”; however, he 
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failed to plead facts to support this allegation.  As we noted in our decision upholding the 
dismissal of his sixth § 1983 action, “[t]he Board suspended Singer’s license 20 years ago 
and the ongoing harm that he has suffered is traceable to that suspension.”  Singer, 523 F. 
App’x at 187.  His allegation that “[d]efendants continue to use their position to commit 
official oppression to persecute [Singer] for exercising his constitutional rights” and his 
references to “fraudulent concealment and RICO violations by [the] government” and 
“[n]ew continuing violations, related to different parties committed [sic] different 
violations” are vague and do not relate to any specific defendant.  Although he claims 
“recent continuing violations by Gillespie, Harris[,] and Ulrich confirm additional 
retaliation which specifically relates back to the beginning of all violations,” the most 
recent of these allegations is 2010, more than two years before the filing of the complaint.   
 Finally, the allegations against John Pifer, said to occur within the statute of 
limitations, fail to state a claim for relief.  Singer merely states that Pifer, a Pennsylvania 
State Police (PSP) officer, contacted Dorothy Cotter, an individual Singer knew, and 
informed her that the PSP were searching for Singer because he had allegedly made 
“threats.”  Singer maintains that Pifer should have investigated the incident further after 
Cotter informed him that Singer had “reported child abuse, but the child abuse was 
covered up, like Penn State.”  Singer does not explain how this conversation, which 
occurred in 2011, “direct[ly] result[ed]” in the “loss of income from his profession of 
choice.”  Without more, there is no stated cause of action against Pifer.  See Bell Atl. 
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (A plaintiff must supply “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”).  
 In light of the fact that Singer’s claims against all of the defendants were 
indisputably unsuccessful, we find no error with the District Court's decision to dismiss 
the complaint with prejudice.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112–
13 (3d Cir. 2002).  We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
